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Sacrificial moral dilemmas are widely used to investigate when, how, and why people make 
judgments that are consistent with utilitarianism. But to what extent can responses to 
sacrificial dilemmas shed light on utilitarian decision making? We consider two key questions: 
First, how meaningful is the relationship between responses to sacrificial dilemmas and what 
is distinctive of a utilitarian approach to morality? Second, to what extent do findings about 
sacrificial dilemmas generalise to other moral contexts where there is tension between 
utilitarianism and common-sense intuitions? We argue that sacrificial dilemmas only capture 
one point of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality, and new paradigms 
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Utilitarianism, Trolley Dilemmas, and Moral Psychology 
 
Moral philosophers aim to develop systematic normative theories of right and wrong. 
Utilitarianism (see Glossary) is a famous if controversial example of such a theory, positing 
that the whole of morality can be deduced from a single general principle: always act in the 
way that would impartially maximise aggregate well-being [1–5]. Out of the philosophy 
seminar room, however, most people typically make moral judgments not by applying a theory 
or explicit principles, but by following highly specific norms and intuitions [e.g. 6]. Philosophers 
often call this pre-philosophical sensibility common-sense morality (CSM), and a great 
deal of research into moral psychology involves mapping out CSM: uncovering its structure, 
psychological underpinning, and developmental, social and evolutionary origins. This research 
program has revealed that in many moral contexts, most people reject choices that maximise 
utility if doing so violates certain moral rules or is perceived as compromising ‘sacred’ values. 
For example, people typically give greater moral weight to acts over omissions [7–9], depart 
from utilitarian analysis in charitable giving [10], and regard punishment as deserved 
independently of any consequentialist deterrent effect [11]. In this body of research, it is 
usually assumed that such rejections of a utility-maximising goal are driven by different 
cognitive biases in different contexts, and that these rejections and their corresponding biases 
therefore need to be studied piecemeal [e.g. 12–14]. 
A different approach emerged at the turn of the new millennium, one largely focusing on 
responses to so-called sacrificial dilemmas like the trolley scenarios first introduced by 
philosophers [15,16]. In these, participants are asked whether it is morally acceptable to 
sacrifice one or more individuals to save the lives of a greater number. Whereas utilitarianism 
tells us to always save the greatest number, a large majority of people reject this ‘pro-
sacrificial’ choice in scenarios involving directly harming the victim, e.g. pushing someone off 
a footbridge to block a runaway train  (note that throughout we use ‘pro-sacrificial’ as a purely 
descriptive label referring simply to approving the sacrifice of some to save a greater number). 
The sacrificial dilemmas paradigm has since come to dominate the study of utilitarian and non-
utilitarian (or ‘deontological’) approaches to moral decision-making [e.g. 17–25], and, indeed, 
has become a “standard methodology for research on moral judgment” [26]. Although some 
critics have highlighted the highly artificial character of sacrificial dilemmas [27], sacrificial 
dilemmas mirror difficult decisions that can arise in military and medical contexts. They are 
therefore are a powerful tool for studying the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying 
judgments about what we call instrumental harm (IH)—the moral permissibility of 
harming some for a greater good.  
However, part of the reason the sacrificial dilemmas paradigm has been so influential is 
because it is taken to teach us general lessons about moral psychology. A prominent example 
is the dual process model (DPM) of moral psychology [e.g. 19,28,18,21]. According to the 
DPM, a refusal to sacrifice individuals for the greater good, and thus to maximise utility, is 
based in immediate intuition and emotional gut-reactions. In contrast, the DPM claims that 
when people make pro-sacrificial choices—often called utilitarian judgments—they employ 
deliberative processing to repress such intuitive aversion to harming, allowing them to resolve 
the dilemma using utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. In its most ambitious form, the DPM draws 
on the unusual context of sacrificial dilemmas to make general claims about two opposing 
modes of moral decision-making that echo explicit philosophical theories, suggesting that “the 
terms ’deontology’ and ‘consequentialism’ refer to psychological natural kinds”, and are 
“philosophical manifestations of two dissociable psychological patterns, two different ways of 
moral thinking” [28]. Correspondingly, it has been argued that the DPM sheds light on the 
psychological sources of utilitarian ethics, and even supports it as a normative view (e.g. 
18,21,33,34). Importantly, however, even researchers who do not operate within the DPM 
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framework routinely present sacrificial dilemmas research as capturing the core contrast 
between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical approaches, and often make seemingly general 
claims about the psychological factors and processes that drive ‘utilitarian judgment’ [30,31],  
and attribute utilitarian tendencies to individuals [24,32] and specific populations [33,34]. 
 
Using Sacrificial Dilemmas to Understand Utilitarian Moral Psychology 
Our aim here is to clarify the relationship between the sacrificial dilemma paradigm, 
utilitarian ethical theory, and lay moral psychology. This relationship has two aspects. The 
first, which we shall largely focus on, is whether utilitarianism—a normative ethical theory—
provides a fruitful framework for interpreting the responses of lay persons to sacrificial 
dilemmas and, indeed, to other moral contexts. The second is whether empirical research 
using sacrificial dilemmas can shed light on the “cognitive building blocks of utilitarian 
philosophy” [5] and even, as a potential further step, support (or undermine) normative 
ethical theories. The two are related: if responses to sacrificial dilemmas and the processes 
underlying them bear a sufficiently meaningful connection to utilitarianism, then it is more 
likely that these processes are a psychological source of this normative theory. But this will 
require that the answer to the first question be substantive enough: if by ‘utilitarian’ we mean 
something generic, non-distinctive, and only loosely linked to the ethical theory, then the 
psychological processes one identifies are unlikely to tell us much about utilitarianism. 
In what follows, we review the debate about the relationship between pro-sacrificial 
judgments and utilitarianism. We highlight important conceptual and methodological advances 
that clarify different senses in which pro-sacrificial judgment might be usefully called 
‘utilitarian’. However, we will also argue that sacrificial dilemmas can shed light only on some 
ways in which lay moral psychology echoes utilitarianism. What is needed is a multi-
dimensional approach [e.g. 35] that can incorporate insights from research into sacrificial 
dilemmas while also directing attention to hitherto neglected ways in which utilitarianism can 
inform the study of lay moral psychology.  
The discussion will be structured around two key questions about the relationship 
between pro-sacrificial judgments and utilitarianism. The first is the Internal Content 
Question: is there a sufficient resemblance between pro-sacrificial judgments, and the 
processes generating them, with what is distinctive of utilitarian decision-making? The second 
is the Generality Question: even if people do engage in something resembling a utilitarian 
decision-making procedure in the specific context of sacrificial dilemmas, do the associated 
psychological processes also drive other utilitarian departures from CSM? Answers to these 
questions can help clarify what can be learned from the sacrificial dilemmas paradigm while 
also highlighting its limits, and the need for new research paradigms. 
 
The Internal Content Question  
 
One major challenge has centred around the persistent association of pro-sacrificial 
judgments with markedly anti-social personality traits and beliefs [36], leading researchers to 
suggest that characterising pro-sacrificial judgments as utilitarian is misleading [e.g. 36–39]. It 
has been found, for example, that pro-sacrificial judgments are associated with reduced 
aversion to harm [40], psychopathy at both a clinical [33] and sub-clinical level [e.g. 36,37], 
and even with endorsement of rational and ethical egoism: the idea that, contra the utilitarian 
focus on impartial welfare maximisation, an action is rational or moral only if it maximizes 
one’s own self-interest [37]. This association raised the worry that many pro-sacrificial 
choices merely reflect a weaker aversion to harming others, regardless of the benefit, rather 
than a greater concern about consequences [e.g. 37–39]. If so, then there may be only a 
superficial overlap between the pro-sacrificial judgments and the prescriptions of 
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utilitarianism. Consequently, studying sacrificial dilemmas will tell us little about why and how 
utilitarians depart from CSM. Call this the Internal Content Question: 
 
Internal Content Question: Are pro-sacrificial judgments the result of meaningfully utilitarian 
processes or is this just a superficial overlap in judgments in a highly unusual context? 
 
Note that what is at issue is not whether individuals make pro-sacrificial decisions due to 
a conscious application of utilitarian principles (which few, if any, laypeople are likely to do) 
but whether there is a sufficiently meaningful overlap between the moral reasons that justify 
the sacrifice from a utilitarian standpoint and what makes some ordinary lay-people endorse 
the sacrifice (40). 
Two developments have sought to address this challenge. The first is conceptual: 
conceding that many pro-sacrificial judgments may be ‘utilitarian’ only in the sense that they 
overlap with paradigmatic utilitarian prescriptions, while distinguishing a range of more 
meaningful ways in which judgments can echo genuine utilitarian decision-making without 
involving the application of an explicit theory [21] (see Box 1 for discussion). This, however, 
leads to the question whether the pro-sacrificial judgments of at least some lay people do 
reflect such heightened concern for consequences rather than mere indifference to harm. The 
second advance aims to address this question via an important refinement of the sacrificial 
dilemma paradigm. As we have seen, conventional dilemma analyses fail to distinguish a 
“utilitarian” tendency to maximise good outcomes from the absence of “deontological” 
concerns about causing harm. It has been argued that when these are teased apart using the 
technique of process dissociation (PD) (see Box 2), we can identify a subset of pro-sacrificial 
judgments (the ‘U-parameter’) that does reflect a genuine concern for the greater good and 
is therefore meaningfully utilitarian [20,21], although research so far suggests that indifference 
to harm is a stronger driver of pro-sacrificial choices [21]. More recent refinements of the 
paradigm have sought to extract a third factor shaping responses to sacrificial dilemmas: a 
preference for inaction over action [22]. 
These methodological advances try to address the Internal Content Question by 
distinguishing pro-sacrificial judgments that merely superficially overlap with utilitarianism 
from those that involve genuine concern about outcomes, although at the cost of removing 
the simplicity that made sacrificial dilemmas so attractive as a general paradigm for studying 
moral decision-making. 
However, while a concern about saving a greater number of lives does bear an obvious 
resemblance to the utilitarian aim, several important gaps remain. First, PD measures a greater 
concern for better outcomes. However, nearly all ethical theories say that saving more lives 
is better.  What is distinctive about utilitarianism in its classical form is that it says that we must 
save the most lives we can—that it is morally required (not merely permissible) to sacrifice 1 
life to save 2, or 50 to save 52. At present, there is no evidence from PD or traditional analyses 
suggesting that lay people make such judgments – and some evidence showing they don’t 
[41,42].  Second, utilitarianism instructs us to maximise utility in an uncompromisingly impartial 
way. Yet there is considerable evidence that pro-sacrificial judgments are strongly influenced 
by whether those sacrificed/saved belong to one’s ingroup [e.g. 43,44], and as of yet no 
evidence that the PD’s U-parameter is associated with greater impartiality. We will return to 
this issue below. 
Current evidence thus suggests that many instances of pro-sacrificial judgments are 
merely superficially consistent with utilitarianism, and describing such judgments as ‘utilitarian’ 
can be misleading. The PD approach offers an important tool for distinguishing such judgments 
that are merely driven by lack of aversion to harming from those reflecting genuine concern 
for saving more lives [20,21]. However, while PD’s U-parameter bears similarity in content 
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to utilitarianism, there is still a significant gap that means that even this sub-factor of pro-
sacrificial judgments could be described as utilitarian only in a qualified sense [see also 
36,39,37,45,46,38]. 
Similar issues can be raised about the content of the cognitive processes that drive pro-
sacrificial judgments, or even specifically the U-parameter. Suppose the DPM is correct in 
holding that deliberative processes are required to allow us to overcome common-sense 
intuitions against pro-sacrificial decisions—explaining why, for example, pro-sacrificial 
judgments have been found to be less frequent under cognitive load [47,48]. Still, pro-
sacrificial judgments do not seem to involve greater deliberative effort when they are 
‘impersonal’ (e.g. diverting a trolley rather than pushing someone) and even in more emotive 
sacrificial dilemmas there is no effect of time pressure when making pro-sacrificial decisions 
with efficient kill-save ratios (e.g.  sacrificing 1 to save 500 rather than 5) [48]. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that deliberative effort is needed to make the trivial ‘cost-benefit analysis’ that 5 lives 
is greater than 1. This suggests that evidence for the role of deliberative processes in pro-
sacrificial judgments may merely reflect the fact that any counter-intuitive moral judgment 
requires greater cognitive effort [49,50,but see 51]. Such counterintuitive judgments could be 
in line with utilitarianism, but could also be ‘Kantian’ [49] or even egoistic. Indeed, recent 
research supports a role of deliberative processes when overriding CSM in favour of self-
interested choices [52,53]. To the extent that deliberation seems to underlie both egoistic 
and utilitarian departures from CSM, the contrast between deliberative vs. intuitive processes 
is likely to be too generic to account for what is distinctive about proto-utilitarian forms of 
moral decision-making [50]. 
 
The Generality Question 
 
Even if the anti-social pathway to pro-sacrificial judgments can be parcelled out using 
process dissociation and at least some people engage in something resembling genuine 
utilitarian decision-making within the specific context of sacrificial dilemma, there remains what 
we call the Generality Question:  
 
Generality Question: is there a meaningful link between pro-sacrificial judgments and other 
utilitarian departures from CSM? And if so, does investigating the processes driving pro-
sacrificial judgments shed general light on why and how people make utilitarian departures 
from CSM?  
 
This would not be such a significant issue if sacrificial dilemmas captured the key way 
in which utilitarians rejects CSM. But while utilitarianism does notoriously instruct us to harm 
some to benefit a greater number, this endorsement of instrumental harm is just one of many 
ways in which utilitarianism departs from CSM, and arguably not the central one. A more 
fundamental, positive aspect of utilitarianism is what we call impartial beneficence (IB), 
the injunction to act in ways that give equal moral weight to the interests of everyone on the 
planet. In practical terms, this can lead to demands for extreme self-sacrifice to benefit distant 
strangers [54,55]. In addition, utilitarians reject retributive justice, special moral obligations to 
those close to us, the act/omission distinction, intrinsic significance to fairness or rights, and 
so forth [13,56,57]. The psychological underpinnings of these central utilitarian departures 
from CSM are of considerable theoretical and practical interest—and must be addressed by 
a comprehensive account of utilitarian psychology. So what, if anything, does the psychology 
of pro-sacrificial judgments tell us about the processes involved in other utilitarian departures 
from CSM?  
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 At the level of individuals, if when individuals make pro-sacrificial judgments they are 
manifesting a generalizable proto-utilitarian approach to moral questions, we should expect 
them to also do so in at least some other contexts. There is considerable evidence, however, 
that pro-sacrificial judgments do not generalise in this way [37]. Even when controlling for the 
anti-social element in pro-sacrificial judgments, we found no association between ‘utilitarian’ 
judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and central utilitarian departures from CSM relating to 
impartial beneficence, such as assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and 
impartiality [37] Moreover, even when the more “utilitarian” U-parameter is extracted using 
PD, it is uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with such characteristic utilitarian 
prescriptions relating to impartial beneficence (e.g., thinking that the affluent should do more 
to help needy people in developing countries, or that we must tackle climate change to 
prevent harm to future generations) [21]. Such findings support a conceptualization of the U-
parameter as “tracking a commitment to the local minimization of harm rather than a global 
pursuit of the greater good that goes beyond conventional expectations” [21]. Yet such global 
pursuit of the greater good, well beyond conventional expectations, is in fact at the 
philosophical core of utilitarianism. Thus, even the U-parameter appears to reflect only a 
tendency to favour better consequences in a specific (and unusual) moral context rather than 
a more general proto-utilitarian approach to moral decision-making. (To our knowledge, there 
is as of yet no research investigating whether the U-factor is associated with greater 
impartiality within the context of sacrificial dilemmas, but this seems unlikely given the evidence 
reviewed above). Moreover, given that a tendency to make pro-sacrificial judgments (or the 
U-parameter more specifically) does not generalise to other moral domains, we still lack an 
account of why such ‘utilitarian decision-making’ is triggered in some contexts but not others. 
In reply, it has been argued that sacrificial dilemmas are best seen as shedding light, not 
on the proto-utilitarian tendencies of individuals, but on the processes that underlie 
paradigmatic judgments consistent with utilitarianism [21,58] . However, what scant evidence 
there is suggests the cognitive processes that have been claimed to underlie pro-sacrificial 
decisions do not generalize to other kinds of characteristic utilitarian judgments. For instance, 
different psychological traits are associated with making judgments in line with utilitarianism 
in the context of sacrificial dilemmas and in that of impartial beneficence, providing indirect 
evidence that such judgments involve different psychological processes [35,37]. This is 
supported by a conceptual priming study that found that priming intuition reduces pro-
sacrificial judgments—in line with the DPM—but there was no comparable effect on utilitarian 
judgments relating to self-sacrifice and impartial concern for others [59], contrary to 
predictions made by prominent proponents of the DPM [28]. Another recent study found 
that a tendency to morally prioritise humans over animals decreased when participants were 
primed to think emotionally as opposed to deliberately—i.e. greater deliberation was 
associated with reduced impartiality [60].  
Research employing sacrificial dilemmas regularly report findings about the processes 
driving or influencing ‘utilitarian’ judgment [17,20,30,31,61] as well as about the utilitarian 
tendencies of certain populations [32–34,62]. Such claims can suggest a generality and in some 
cases—as in the initial statements of the DPM—are clearly intended to have such general 
scope [28,63; though more recent formulations of the DPM are more qualified; see 21]. 
However, while further research into this issue is needed, the current evidence suggests that 
responses to sacrificial dilemmas do not generalize—at either the individual or the process 
level—to other paradigmatic contexts where utilitarianism departs from CSM, such as that of 
impartial beneficence. Caution is therefore warranted when linking psychological factors, 
processes, populations, or individuals to ‘utilitarian’ judgment simply on the basis of sacrificial 
dilemmas research. For example, a number of studies have tied empathic concern to a 
reduced tendency to make ‘utilitarian’ judgments. But this is so only in the context of sacrificial 
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dilemmas—we found that empathic concern is also associated with greater tendency to make 
‘utilitarian’ judgments in the context of impartial beneficence [35,37]. It would therefore be 
more precise, we suggest, to use the purely descriptive term ‘pro-sacrificial judgments’ (as we 
do here) or at least to explicitly contextualise by referring to utilitarian judgments in the specific 
context of sacrificial dilemmas.  
 
Moving Forward: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Utilitarian Psychology 
 
We have argued that sacrificial dilemmas have limitations as a general tool for studying 
utilitarian decision-making. They can shed light on one important way in which utilitarianism 
departs from CSM intuitions. But utilitarianism also departs from CSM in other, equally if not 
more important ways—most notably, by demanding a radical form of impartiality. On both 
conceptual and empirical grounds, we should not assume that these departures all reflect a 
single, unitary cognitive phenomenon. Instead, the available evidence suggests that moral 
judgments in other paradigmatic contexts in which utilitarianism departs from CSM are likely 
to be driven by, and involve, different psychological factors and processes than those that 
drive pro-sacrificial judgments. If so, then sacrificial dilemmas cannot be used to draw general 
lessons about utilitarian judgment or decision-making. 
While utilitarianism does provide distinctive answers to dilemmas involving runaway 
trolleys (or ticking bomb scenarios), it also provides distinctive answers to questions about, 
for example, our obligations to the world’s poor, or the treatment of animals. 
Correspondingly, we need to incorporate the insights of sacrificial dilemmas research while 
considering this much broader range of moral contexts. This will provide a fuller picture of 
the psychological sources of proto-utilitarian forms of moral decision-making while also 
shedding light on counterintuitive moral views that are of considerable independent 
theoretical and practical interest.  
These ideas form the basis for the two-dimensional (2D) model of proto-utilitarian 
psychology [35]. The 2D model (see Box 3 and Figure 1, Key Figure) is inspired by the 
recognition that, conceptually, there are at least two primary ways in which utilitarianism 
departs from our common-sense moral intuitions: it permits harming innocent individuals 
when this maximises aggregate utility (instrumental harm) and it tells us to treat the interests 
of all individuals our acts (or omissions) can affect as equally morally important, without giving 
priority to oneself or those to whom one is especially close (impartial beneficence). As well 
as being conceptually distinct, these aspects of utilitarianism appear psychologically distinct in 
the lay population (though not in trained philosophers; see [35] for further discussion). We 
have already reviewed research showing how judgments in sacrificial dilemmas have little 
correlation with judgments relating to donating money to assist distant needy strangers (an 
example of impartial beneficence) [37], and that cognitive priming manipulations influence 
instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence [59]. Most recently in work developing the 
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS), a large-scale factor analysis found that the 
endorsement of moral claims distinctive of utilitarianism cluster into two independently 
important factors, aligning closely with instrumental harm and impartial beneficence, each of 
which have very different psychological correlates. (Note that while the 2D model emphasises 
these two factors, which emerged from factor analysis of a wide list of items that covered 
other ways in which utilitarianism clashes with CSM, further utilitarian departures from CSM 
also merit close study). 
A multi-dimensional framework can address the issues we outlined above. The Internal 
Content Question asks whether lay moral judgments reflect meaningfully utilitarian processes 
or are merely a superficial overlap in judgments. As a normative theory, utilitarianism claims 
that the morally right act is that which maximises utility from an impartial standpoint, 
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regardless of the means needed to achieve it. This is a simple principle, but it has several 
dimensions which can come apart in the moral thinking of lay people who do not arrive at 
moral decisions by applying such an explicit principle. A key idea of the 2D framework is that 
lay judgments can resemble utilitarian theory in different ways and different degrees. Instead 
of categorically describing lay judgments [17,28], processes [20–22], and the biases of 
individuals [62,64] as ‘utilitarian’, as is now common, on the 2D framework we should 
approach the subcomponents of utilitarianism independently, investigating the degrees to 
which lay moral thinking is impartial, focuses on outcomes rather than on means, etc. In this 
way, the 2D approach breaks down the issue of meaningful relation to more fine-grained sub-
questions that need to be investigated separately (see Outstanding Questions). For instance, 
further research is needed to investigate the processes that underlie different kinds of 
utilitarian departures from CSM intuitions—distinguishing the generic processes involved in 
overcoming strong intuitions of any sort from those that reflect what may be distinctive of 
opting for counterintuitive utilitarian modes of moral thinking. Another issue that requires 
further investigation is the degree to which judgments in line with impartial beneficence 
meaningfully echo utilitarian ideals. Just as some individuals endorse instrumental harm merely 
because they are indifferent to violence, some individuals may make impartial choices simply 
because they independently care less about the self, or have weaker attachments to family, 
place or country; the process dissociation approach could potentially be applied to this issue. 
The Generality Question concerns whether the same psychological processes are 
involved when people depart from CSM to make a pro-sacrificial judgment as when they 
depart from CSM in other utilitarian ways. Existing research indicates that that people who 
make pro-sacrificial judgments do not tend to also endorse self-sacrificial actions to help 
strangers in developing countries, and vice versa. This suggests that it is unlikely that the same 
processes will underlie both kinds of judgments, though this issue requires further 
investigation. It is possible, for example, that since radical impartiality is highly counterintuitive, 
it might too rely on the deliberative processes thought to underlie some pro-sacrificial 
decisions. Critically, though, the 2D model does not assume that the same processes underlie 
different kinds of proto-utilitarian decisions. Sacrificial dilemmas are useful for studying 
instrumental harm, but dedicated dilemmas are needed to investigate the psychology 
underlying endorsement of impartial beneficence [see 37].  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Nearly two decades of research have used sacrificial dilemmas to shed light on utilitarian 
decision-making, but sacrificial dilemmas are just one instance where there is tension between 
utilitarianism and common-sense moral views. We have argued that to understand proto-
utilitarian decision-making more generally, it is critical to adopt a multi-dimensional approach, 
looking at both instrumental harm and impartial beneficence. Previous research employing 
sacrificial dilemmas has yielded important insights into our understanding of instrumental 




Common-sense morality (CSM): This is a term that moral philosophers use to describe 
the pre philosophical moral intuitions that humans typically share – what psychologists might 
call “lay morality”. Most people, for example, object to gratuitous cruelty, distinguish 
between acts and omissions, and think we have special obligations to our family. 
 
Dual Process Model (DPM): The model proposed by Greene and colleagues. According 
to the DPM, non-utilitarian (often referred to as deontological) aspects of CSM (e.g. refusing 
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to sacrifice the one) are based in immediate intuitions and emotional responses, while 
“utilitarian” judgments (e.g. sacrificing one to save a greater number) are uniquely 
attributable to effortful moral reasoning. 
 
Impartial Beneficence (IB): Utilitarianism requires us to impartially maximize the well-
being of all sentient beings on the planet, not privileging compatriots, family members, or 
ourselves over strangers. This is the ‘positive’ dimension of utilitarianism that we call 
impartial beneficence. 
 
Instrumental Harm (IH): One way that utilitarianism departs from common-sense 
morality is that utilitarianism permits, or even requires, many acts that CSM strictly forbids. 
This is a ‘negative’ dimension of utilitarianism that we call instrumental harm because 
according to utilitarianism we should instrumentally use, severely harm, or even kill 
innocent people to promote the greater good.  
 
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS): The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale was developed by 
Kahane & Everett et al. [35] as a brief measure of individual differences in proto-utilitarian 
moral tendencies. The scale consists of 9 items in two sub-scales: Instrumental Harm (OUS-
IH) and Impartial Beneficence (OUS-IB). The OUS-IB subscale consists of 5 items that tapping 
endorsement of the impartial maximization of the greater good, even at the great personal 
cost (e.g. “It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate 
it to causes that provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal”). The OUS-IH 
subscale consists of 4 items tapping a willingness to cause harm in order to bring about the 
greater good (e.g. “It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a 
necessary means to helping several other innocent people”). 
 
Pro-sacrificial/Pro-sacrificial judgements: Pro-sacrificial judgments, as we use the term, 
is a purely descriptive label that refers to morally approving the sacrifice of some to save a 
greater number. Critically, this label is meant to describe such judgments without any 
presumption of motive, underlying process, or philosophical commitments and is therefore, 
we suggest, preferable to describing such judgments as “utilitarian”. 
 
Two-Dimensional (2D) Model: The model proposed by Kahane, Everett, and colleagues. 
According to the 2D model, proto-utilitarian decision-making in the lay population involves 
two largely independent dimensions: instrumental harm, and impartial beneficence. These 
have different psychological correlates, and are likely to rely on different processes. 
 
Utilitarianism: Utilitarianism is a normative ethical theory associated with philosophers 
such as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Peter Singer, positing that the whole of 
morality can be deduced from a single general principle: always act in the way that would 
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Box 1: What is a “utilitarian” judgment? 
 
 Researchers routinely describe pro-sacrificial judgments as ‘utilitarian judgments’, 
report factors associated with different rates of ‘utilitarian’ judgments and describe 
populations as more or less utilitarian. We have argued that pro-sacrificial judgments often 
have little meaningful relationship to utilitarian ethics, and that while some pro-sacrificial 
judgments reflect aspects of utilitarian reasoning, even these are narrowly focused on the 
sacrificial context.  
 Any terminology can be valid if clearly defined and widely understood. However, 
some terminologies are perspicuous while others are imprecise, have irrelevant associations 
or are potentially misleading. We propose that it is more helpful to refer to moral 
judgments favouring the sacrifice of some to save a greater number as ‘pro-sacrificial’: a 
purely descriptive label making no commitment to underlying motivations or processes. 
Since utilitarian reasoning has multiple dimensions, it is imprecise to categorically refer to 
judgments, processes or individuals as ‘utilitarian’. Instead, we should directly describe these 
in terms of the sub-components our 2D model highlights. For example, pro-sacrificial 
judgments may reflect endorsement of instrumental harm but not greater impartiality, 
whereas the reverse may be true of judgments endorsing sacrifices in aid of distant 
strangers. 
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 A contrasting approach defines ‘utilitarian’ as any moral judgment that happens to be 
consistent with utilitarian theory, even if the reasons driving that judgment bear no 
relationship to utilitarianism [21]. Such judgments can be described as ‘level 1’ utilitarian, but 
should still be contrasted with ways in which judgments can genuinely echo utilitarian 
reasoning: by being driven by calculation of aggregate utility (level 2); genuine concern for 
the greater good in a specific context (level 3); a general concern for the greater good (level 
4); and, finally, applying an explicit utilitarian theory (level 5). By making clear that no 
meaningful relationship with utilitarianism is intended, such an approach presents an advance 
over the looser way in which the term ‘utilitarian judgment’ is often used.  
However, it still seems unhelpful to describe behaviour using theoretical labels that 
bear merely an accidental relationship to that behaviour. Moreover, such a labelling system 
might misleadingly suggest that there is a common psychological phenomenon underlying a 
range of behaviours that are only arbitrarily grouped together. More importantly, even if 
researchers insist on using ‘utilitarian’ to refer to any pro-sacrificial judgment, there is no 
basis for reserving this label only to judgments about instrumental harm. Judgments 
endorsing self-sacrifice to aid distant strangers to make the world overall better are surely 
as deserving of that label. This means that ‘utilitarian’ must always be explicitly relativized to 
a moral context, and we should not report without qualification, that, e.g., ‘empathic 
concern is associated with reduced rates of utilitarian judgment’ when this is the case only 
in the sacrificial dilemma context but not in others (e.g. of impartial beneficence). 
 
Box 2: Process Dissociation 
 
Process dissociation is a data analytic approach that allows researchers to examine 
the contribution of two distinct processes to a given behaviour by comparing the outcomes 
on trials in which the two processes should lead to the same outcome (congruent trials) 
versus those in which the two processes should lead to opposite outcomes (incongruent 
trials). Originally developed in cognitive psychology by Jacoby and colleagues [65], Conway 
and Gawronski [20] applied process dissociation to sacrificial dilemmas by studying 
responses in incongruent dilemmas in which harm maximises outcomes and congruent 
dilemmas in which harm does not maximise outcomes. 
Incongruent dilemmas are typical sacrificial dilemmas where, for example, one must 
decide whether to administer a treatment that will prove fatal to some but will save the 
lives of many others.  Congruent dilemmas, in contrast, are dilemmas where the harm is the 
same – administering a treatment that will prove fatal to some - but where doing so will not 
maximise outcomes (for example, where it will shorten the duration of a non-fatal disease 
that most will recover from naturally).  
Process dissociation then involves applying participants’ responses across these 
congruent and incongruent dilemmas to a decision processing tree that allows researchers 
to calculate two parameters representing the influence of each tendency. The first 
parameter reflects those with relatively stronger harm-rejection tendencies (the “D-
parameter” indicating ‘deontological’ inclinations to avoid causing harm), who consistently 
reject causing harm in the dilemmas, whether or not such harm would lead to overall 
positive consequences. The second parameter reflects those with outcome-maximisation 
tendencies (the “U-parameter”, reflecting ‘utilitarian’ inclinations to optimize results), who 
tend to aim for the best possible consequences in the dilemma regardless of whether doing 
so requires causing harm or not (i.e., they endorse harm when it maximises overall welfare 
but reject harm when it doesn’t).  
By calculating these parameters across the congruent and incongruent dilemmas, 
process dissociation is intended to allow researchers to distinguish between different 
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patterns underlying the same conventional dilemma decision. Consider a person who tends 
to make pro-sacrificial decisions in the dilemmas - this response tendency could reflect a 
weak aversion against causing harm (i.e., low D-parameter) associated with anti-social 
personality traits, or could reflect an increased concern to minimise overall harm. 
Moreover, PD can identify cases where people score high on both response tendencies, 
which then largely cancel out on conventional measures (i.e., a suppression effect). For 
example, people scoring higher on moral identity internalization tend to score high on both 
the D and U parameters, and these duelling positive effects cancel out to a null effect on 




Box 3: The Two-Dimensional Model of Proto-Utilitarian Psychology 
 
According to the two-dimensional model of proto-utilitarian psychology, there are two 
main psychological dimensions of utilitarianism. First, Impartial Beneficence (IB) reflects the 
extent to which individuals endorse the impartial promotion of everyone’s welfare. Second, 
instrumental harm (IH) reflects the extent to which people endorse harm that brings about 
a greater good. By dissociating these two factors of utilitarianism, one can reach a more 
nuanced picture of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population.  
Instrumental harm can be measured using sacrificial dilemmas, reflecting one key way 
that utilitarianism departs from CSM: it permits, or even requires, many acts that CSM 
forbids. While CSM tends to reject instrumental harm (except when the benefits are very 
large), according to utilitarianism we should always use, harm, or even kill innocent people if 
this leads to a greater good. Much sacrificial dilemma research has investigated this 
dimension, and the 2D model can incorporate many of these insights - while also 
recognising instrumental harm is not the only (or even most important) way in which 
utilitarianism departs from CSM. 
Impartial beneficence reflects a second, more fundamental way that utilitarianism 
departs from CSM: utilitarianism requires us to impartially maximize the well-being of all 
sentient beings in such a way that “[e]ach is to count for one and none for more than one” 
[1], meaning that it requires altruist sacrifices that CSM sees at best as permissible or 
supererogatory. While IH is an important implication of utilitarian principles, IB is directly 
written into the utilitarian ideal. It is for this reason that IB, not IH, is the central utilitarian 
aim. Peter Singer – the most prominent living utilitarian - may have defended infanticide in 
some contexts, an example of IH, but his core moral aims are the ones relating to IB – e.g. 
making great sacrifices to prevent the suffering of the world’s poor or of animals. 
Utilitarianism demands much more than CSM, both how much we should sacrifice and for 
whose sake, and IB represents this radically impartial and demanding core of utilitarianism, 
beyond more familiar forms of altruism and pro-sociality. For example, while CSM 
encourages modest acts of charity if the sacrifice is not too great (with anything beyond 
being supererogatory), utilitarianism demands that we do the most good we can [55], 
forgoing luxuries and undergoing relative financial hardship to help those who are much 
worse off. Similarly, CSM typically endorses the helping of those near-and-dear to us, while 
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